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[i]LM Operational Instrumentation Impact With the Loss of Jared R. Woodfill September 24, 1968 [list=1][*]As the result of the manner in which I have assigned the various tasks within the subsystem, Mr. Woodfill is the Caution and Warning expert within the subsystem (within the Center, actually). In order for me to keep abreast of the subsystem problems and activities as a whole and the transducer problems in particular, I have been quite divorced from C and W activities and have, therefore, relied very heavily upon Mr. Woodfill in this area. He has been the subsystem C and W representative in all meetings with Morris, General Bolender, Mr. Low and GAEC. Since ASPO Systems Engineering would not help us in resolving the multitude (15 or more) of interface problems between CWEA and other subsystems, we have been forced to carry the ball in this area. I emphasize term “caution and warning” as opposed to CWEA, for we are working with the C and W system as opposed to just a black box. Knowledge of the C&W cannot be acquired in a matter of weeks. It would severely handicap the subsystem to not only lose the expert, but to have to spend effort in training a replacement. The required knowledge can only be gained through many months of experience with the C and W system. Besides, Mr. Woodfill would take with him specific knowledge that he has gained in handling past problems. This information would never be available to a replacement. Since Mr. O’Brien has not been involved in the C and W system, there would not be a particular advantage in letting him be the replacement. This would create the requirement to train two people – Mr. O’Brien and his SCEA, DSEA, and TE replacement. [*]The CWEA interfaces with almost all of the LM subsystems (EPS, ECS, G and N, AGS, RCS, Propulsion, Radar, Comm., and Display and Controls). All CWEA inputs are time critical in the operation of the spacecraft. That was the principle criteria in determining which parameters were to be routed into the CWEA. [*]There is no one at GAEC that is working on the C and W system on a full time basis. One GAEC engineer is responsible for the CWEA box, and the GAEC instrumentation subsystem manager and assistant subsystem manager work on the C and W system problems only on a “fire-fighting” basis. It seems that they do not know much more about the C and W system than I do. It was the lack of C and W system engineering at GAEC in the first phases of the LM program that has caused the interface problems that have popped up in the past few months.[/list][/i]
[i]I was responsible for the warning system hardware on both the Command Module and Lunar Module (the Command Module's Caution Detection Unit –CDU- and the lander's Caution and Warning Electronics Assembly -CWEA) by default I became the ex-officio Caution and Warning Subsystem Manager. While I never received that title or corresponding financial benefit, the role was altogether crucial to the success of Apollo and safety of the crew. Additionally, it thrust me into the midst of all things Apollo: management reviews, failure analysis, mission analysis, visits by flight controllers, Apollo astronauts, and personal phone calls from program managers. Suddenly, I was in demand to head Caution and Warning reviews with the prime contractor and NASA subsystem managers to redesign and correct flaws in the alarm systems. Though not an official subsystem manager, my assumed responsibility exceeded that of the other subsystem managers in that I had that duty for both the North American Command Module and Grumman Lunar Module. All other subsystem managers only were responsible for their subsystems for either the CSM or the LM, not both vehicles. I had both in my ex-officio capacity. This was fortuitous by virtue of being able to correct deficiencies found in either spacecraft’s warning system benefitting its counterpart in the sister spacecraft. While most SSMs' monitoring of their systems focused mostly on their vehicle’s crucial mission phase, because I had both vehicles’ alarm systems, my responsibility was throughout the entire mission to the Moon, [list=1][*]launch and ferry to the Moon in the CSM as well as [*]lunar descent, stay and ascent in the Lunar Module, and [*]lastly, the CSM’s return to Earth, entry and landing.[/list] And throughout the entire mission, numerous nuisance alarms sounded in both vehicles at all mission phases. To this end, I had to be familiar with the design and idiosyncrasies of all Apollo spacecraft systems. Fortunately, our spacecraft subsystem managers and project engineers for electrical power, instrumentation, and communication were in the same NASA MSC unit, the Instrumentation and Electronic Systems Division (IESD) housed in a single building on the MSC campus. This encouraged collaboration between the vehicle engineering experts for both the CSM and LM in our division. The rescue of Apollo 13 greatly benefitted from this situation with regard to charging the depleted CSM entry batteries from the large Lunar Module Descent batteries. The SSMs for both vehicles worked out the life-saving jumper charge procedure in the Mission Evaluation Room in Building 45. [URL=https://drive.google.com/open?id=1IlEbspP_wUQN1_Fx8aV3VLqmRo5er1Nc]Here is a picture[/URL] of this crucial effort in April of 1970 at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, Texas. At the far right corner is Art Campos who innovated the procedure to charge the depleted CSM entry batteries using the large batteries in the Lunar Module’s descent stage. Art was the Subsystem Manager for the Lunar Module’s Electrical Power System. Others included in the picture are the CSM Subsystem Manger for the CSM electrical power system. Art and I spent many hours dealing with the interface between the Lander’s electrical power system and the caution and warning system. Because we were in adjacent offices in Building 15 of the MSC, this was possible. I specifically remember how challenging was creating the matrix below of all the permutations and combinations of characteristics of the suit fan caution and warning light and master alarm. I was able to have this information entered into the Apollo Operations Handbook and in turn into the crew check list instructions for moon missions. [URL=https://drive.google.com/open?id=1wjTZHdRlawct-ewYOnJDp1S4bKLU-g7e]This picture[/URL] shows Art, the Lunar Module Electrical Power System Subsystem Manager, seated behind me in the Mission Evaluation Room (MER) in Building 45 adjacent to the Mission Control Center (MCC) in Building 30.[/i]
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